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Chapter 1: "The World Cup of Peace" 
"The day that 25 million Argentines aim for the same goal, Argentina will be a winner not once, 
but a thousand times over"ill 
- Jose Alfredo Martinez de Hoz, Argentine Minister of Economy during the 1978 World Cup 
I: Preparing the Victory 
Argentina's "World Cup of Peace" started and ended triumphantly, at least for those in 
charge. The three week long tournament culminated on June 25th, 1978, when the hosts defeated 
Holland three to one to bring the World Cup trophy to Argentina for the first time in the nation's 
history. The triumph prompted massive celebrations across the country, as a nation loudly, if not 
collectively, rejoiced in La Albiceleste's triumph on the biggest stage in world soccer. It also 
brought questions with few immediate answers. As mothers and relatives searched in vain for 
their "disappeared" relatives, international news sources and opinions openly doubted the 
validity of Argentina's on field triumphs and wondered what truly lay beyond the propaganda 
curtain drawn over the nation by its military rulers during June 1978. Thirty years after the 
tournament, Argentines still define and discuss EIMundial in myriad ways. This chapter 
examines the paradoxes of the 1978 World Cup, and seeks to establish the historical foundation 
needed to critically analyze the manner in which players, coaches, and fans remember 
Argentina's first world title. 
In 1966, FIFA selected Argentina to host the 1978 World Cup, the nth edition of the 
quadrennial tournament (Smith, 69). One decade later, a military coup replaced Isabel Peron's 
government with a military Junta, in the process changing not only the political direction of the 
nation but also its blueprint for hosting a successful tournament in 1978 (Mason, 71). The 
military quickly realized the importance of the World Cup. Athletically, it served as yet another 
opportunity for a soccer-mad Argentina to win the most prestigious, and to that time elusive, 
international title on the planet (Arbena, 120-122). Away from the field, hosting the World Cup 
emerged as a means of demonstrating the military regime's progress in transforming Argentina 
from its dark days under the Peron's to a peaceful, modern nation (Ibid.). On a local level, the 
World Cup also became Argentina's answer to Mexico, a nation that by 1978 had successfully 
hosted both a Summer Olympics in 1968 and a World Cup in 1970 (Ibid.). 
In order to ensure that the World Cup elevated Argentina's international reputation on and 
off the field, the military government accelerated plans for the tournament and declared the event 
a "national priority" (Archetti, 136). The previous regime of Isabel Peron had done little to 
prepare the country to host one of the largest sporting spectacles in the world, and General Jorge 
Vide la's Junta quickly organized and revamped the Ente Autarquico Mundial '78, or EAM, to 
oversee the construction of facilities and overhaul, with the help of an American based 
consulting group, the nation's image (Kuper, 213, Mason, 71). Although estimates of 
government spending differ, it is likely that the Argentinean Junta spent close to seven hundred 
million dollars on the World Cup, a number that dwarfed Spain's costs for the 1982 World Cup 
by around 300% and represented a tenth of the nation's entire spending for 1978 (Kuper, 211, 
Mason, 71). As spending on the World Cup reached unprecedented levels, Argentines joked that 
the World Cup's motto was in fact "Twenty-five million Argentines will pay for the World Cup" 
instead of "Twenty-five million Argentines will play in the World Cup" (Mason, 71, Kuper, 
211). During the two years leading up to June 1978, the Junta built stadiums in Cordoba, Mar de 
Plata, and Mendoza, and renovated grounds in Buenos Aires and Rosario, including EI 
Monumental, the site of the opening ceremonies and final. Per FIF A regulations, Argentine 
authorities installed color television capabilities for broadcasts of the matches (Mason, 71). The 
host nation treated journalists to a newly minted press center, and completely renovated Buenos 
Aires' international airport ("World Cup has Political Tint," The Washington Post, 5/9/1978). To 
further assist the 50,000 expected international fans, authorities also provided bilingual hostesses 
outside stadiums (Mason, 71, Smith, 76). 
Out of the public eye, another set of more sinister plans was also under way. Despite 
intense government repression, guerilla groups such as the M ontoneros still posed a threat to the 
"stability" the Junta sought to establish in the country. On the eve of the tournament, security 
forces initiated "EI Barrido, " a security" [0 jperation" that sought to further cleanse the nation of 
subversives who might stage attacks during games and events, or even have the audacity to speak 
out against the military regime (Kuper, 213). A declaration by the Montoneros themselves 
promising an end to attacks during the World Cup did little to prevent government action 
("Guerillas Vow Not to Halt World Soccer," The Washington Post, 3/26/1977). "Subversives" 
were not the only targets. Presenting a modern Argentina to the world meant denying the 
poverty that racked areas of the country. To prevent foreigners from viewing the villas miseries, 
or shantytowns, on the road to Rosario, the military government constructed a wall depicting 
middle class residences. (Kuper, 213). 
Without control of the press, modern facilities and denials of inequality would have fallen 
short of ensuring the positive depiction of Argentina that the military Junta sought and needed 
(Smith, 69). General Vide la's government was not the first Argentine regime to restrict freedom 
of the press, but its efforts to control journalists and mass media dwarfed the restrictions imposed 
by prior administrations (Ibid., 70-71). The Junta quickly imposed censorship regulations after 
the coup. On April 22nd, 1976, the Junta declared, "it is forbidden to inform, comment or make 
reference to ... subversive incidents, the appearance of bodies and the death of subversive 
elements ... includ[ing] victims of kidnap pings and missing persons" (Ibid., 71). As the World 
Cup drew neared, censorship extended from discussions of "disappeared" persons to commentary 
on La Selecci6n, coach Cesar Luis Menotti, and depictions of Argentina in foreign news sources 
(Ibid., 72-73). Defying censorship codes brought a heavy price. During the Junta's seven years 
in power, around seventy journalists "disappeared" (Ibid., 71). Tellingly, in 1977 the Junta 
disappeared twenty-one journalists, roughly twice the yearly average (Ibid.). It is certainly 
possible that the number of press members who "vanished" is higher in 1977 due to the efforts of 
the military government to consolidate control after the coup, but it seems just as likely that the 
press crackdown had roots in the Junta's desire to control domestic popular opinion leading up to 
the World Cup (Arbena, 123). 
Controlling domestic mass media outlets was only half the battle, and Vide la's Junta also 
quickly, and effectively, targeted foreign press sources. Leading up to the World Cup, both 
Amnesty International and several European organizations recognized the human rights 
violations present in Argentina. While Amnesty promoted an information campaign aimed at 
educating the foreign press, groups in France, Holland, and Sweden openly campaigned for their 
national sides and other teams around the world to boycott the tournament (Smith, 72, "La Otra 
Final"). Comite de Boycott du Mondial de Football en Argentine, or COBA, led the charge, 
publishing literature that visually depicted the 1978 World Cup's official seal, two hands holding 
a soccer ball, surrounded by barbed wire fences reminiscent of Nazi detention centers and 
concentration camps ("La Otra Final"). 
Argentina newspapers responded to foreign pressure by publishing scathing attacks on 
the "campaign[s] of lies" perpetrated outside the nation ("El Gnifico," quoted in Mason, 72) and 
trumpeting the pre-destined victory that awaited the national team on June 25th, 1978. La 
Prensa's World Cup preview named Argentina one of the "cultural center[s] of unquestionable 
world focus" that "could not escape the responsibility to host an international soccer encounter, 
no matter. .. its magnitude" (La Prensa, quoted in Smith, 75). Other articles simply stated, 
"Argentina has already won the World Cup" (El Grafico, quoted in Mason, 72). Responding to 
foreign allegations was not enough, however, and although the Junta awarded close to 7,000 
press credentials to foreign and domestic journalists, the Argentine government closely 
monitored who arrived in Argentina and what they subsequently wrote and said (Smith, 75). 
Vide la's regime briefly jailed a "leftist" Frenchjournalist, and other members of the foreign press 
corps found themselves similarly threatened. In one instance, Argentine journalists even 
attacked a foreign reporter who wrote about gunshots heard close to EI Monumental (Kuper, 
214). The combination of domestic censorship and foreign intimidation certainly did not quell 
all criticism of Argentina's World Cup, but it did manage to quiet some of the most damaging 
attacks (Smith, 76). With preparations winding down, the focus of the Junta, the nation, and the 
world turned to the opening ceremonies. 
*** 
II: The Price of Glory 
Argentina started its run to World Cup glory on June 2nd, 1978, with a two to one victory 
over Hungary. The opening ceremony that preceded the game previewed the triumph that 
ensued, as General Videla declared that the 1978 World Cup would be the "World Cup of Peace" 
(Vide la, quoted in Mason, 72). Off the field, government repression had already turned this 
statement into a lie. Soon enough, events in Rosario would question the good will of the players 
and the intentions of Argentina's government on the field as well. 
After defeating France two to one and falling to Italy one to zero, Argentina advanced 
into the second round of the tournament. The four group winners and runners up from the first 
round made up the elimination round, as teams competed in round robin play in two groups of 
four to determine who would play for the World Cup title on June 25th in Buenos Aires. The 
winners of each group advanced to play one another in EI Monumental, while the runners up in 
each group would play for third place. Following the first round, Argentina faced a mostly South 
American gauntlet of Poland, Peru, and traditional nemesis Brazil. After defeating Poland and 
drawing with Brazil, Argentina closed group play against Peru. A win would leave Argentina 
level on points with their northern rivals, but La Albiceleste needed to beat Peru by at least four 
goals to overcome Brazil's lead in goal differential and secure a place in the final. In short, a 
Herculean task (Kuper, 211). 
On June 21 st, 1978, Argentina decisively, and controversially, won a place in the final. 
La Albiceleste's six to zero demolition of their Peruvian counterparts speaks to the military 
Junta's efforts, perceived or real, to control the World Cup and guarantee Argentina a victory. 
According to multiple sources, Argentine officials bribed Peru to throw the game, enticing 
collaboration with an offer of over thirty thousands tons of grain and $50 million dollars (Kuper, 
211-212). Neither side has ever admitted fixing the game, although Rodolfo Manzo, Peru's 
backup goalie, is rumored to have discussed such an arrangement ( Kuper, 212, Bayer, 130). 
Further, the fact that Peru's starting goalie, Ramon Quiroga, was born in Argentina has raised 
additional doubts about the ability of the Junta to fix the match (Kuper, 212). 
The official FIF A report on the World Cup noted that Argentina "magically gained a 
place in the final" and further commented that the Peru match" was the most sensational result 
of the tournament," but did not directly mention allegations of foul play (Courte, 82, 115). For 
his part, Quiroga denied throwing the game, stating "the allegations [of bribery 1 have hit us hard 
and I know that they will worsen when we arrive [home 1 in Lima ... we did what we could ... we 
played against Argentina with the same desire as we did against Scotland" (Quiroga, quoted in 
Gilbert and Vitagliano, 206). Argentine newspapers responded to public outcry in Peru and 
Brazil, including a headline in Rio de Janeiro's a Globo that labeled Argentina's win "a shameful 
day for soccer," by declaring that Argentina deserved the victory with their superior play (Ibid.). 
In addition to charges of bribery, allegations of doping among key Argentine players 
before both the game against Peru and the final against Holland have also surfaced (Kuper, 219). 
Although rumors of drug use are even less grounded in fact than allegations of bribery - the 
official FIF A report mentions, "Argentina ... seemed fresher and stronger in extra time [of the 
game against Peru]," and author Simon Kuper quotes an unnamed source as asserting that one of 
the Argentine player's urine-based drug tests yielded positive results for pregnancy - their mere 
presence tarnishes the World Cup's credibility (Courte, 119, Kuper, 219). Whether or not 
allegations of bribery and doping are true, the controversy produced by the result demonstrates 
the negative perceptions shared by those abroad, as well as within Argentina, of the Military 
Junta's intentions in staging the tournament. Public outcry did nothing to change the result, 
however, and Argentina advanced to the final against Holland. 
Whereas Argentina's de-facto semifinal match against Peru provided controversy, the 
1978 World Cup final provided drama, and, for Argentina's military Junta, victory. On June 
25th, 1978, extra time goals from tournament stars Mario Kempes and Daniel Bertoni spurred La 
Albiceleste to a three to one victory over the defending world cup champions. As the scoreboard 
on the northern side of EI Monumental proclaimed" Argentina, World Champions!" fans and 
players alike celebrated on the field and across the country (Gilbert and Vitagliano, 227). 
According to one eyewitness, "there was an explosion of ecstasy and hysteria [in Buenos 
Aires] ... [a]ll the country was on the streets" (Kuper, 209). The Washington Post compared the 
party to similar scenes that had played out after Argentine wins throughout the tournament 
("First Title Ignites Wild Celebration," The Washington Post, 6/26/1978). The celebrations 
continued through the night into the following day, when thousands of Argentines gathered in 
the heart of Buenos Aires at the Plaza de Mayo to commemorate the victory with songs and 
patriotic chants (Mason, 72-73, "First Title Ignites Wild Celebration"). Three and a half weeks 
after the start of the tournament, and two years after the military coup, the Junta had their 
victory, and Argentina had the World Cup ("First Title Ignites Wild Celebration, "). 
The rollercoaster events on and off the field before, during, and immediately following 
the conclusion of the 1978 World Cup have shaped the way Argentines remember the 
tournament. The day after the World Cup final, an article in the Washington Post declared, "The 
celebrating may never stop" (Ibid.). The celebrations did stop, however, and, although they 
started once again in 1986 after Diego Maradona led a new wave of national stars to the World 
Cup title in Mexico, Argentines now view the 1978 World Cup with degrees of confusion and 
anger. The return of democracy in 1983 has made many details of the 1978 World Cup more 
accessible to the general public, who in turn have increasingly spoken out for and against the 
"athletic" victory of their team. The next two chapters investigate the memories first of the 
central actors on the field and second of those in the stands, and compare the process of athletic 
memory in Argentina to similar cases, such as the 1936, 1968, and 1972 Summer Olympics in 
Berlin, Mexico, and Munich, respectively. 
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